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Abstract
Risk and time are intertwined. The present is known while the future is
inherently risky. Discounted expected utility provides a simple, coherent struc-
ture for analyzing decisions in intertemporal, uncertain environments. Critical
to such analysis is the notion that certain and uncertain utility are functionally
interchangeable. We document an important and robust violation of discounted
expected utility, which is essentially a violation of this interchangeability. In pa-
rameter estimations, certain utility is found to be almost linear while uncertain
utility is found to be substantially more concave. These results have implications
for discounted expected utility theory and decision theory in general. Applica-
tions are made to dynamic inconsistency, the uncertainty eect, the estimation
of risk preferences, and probability weighting.
JEL classication: D81, D90
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\...I viewed the principle of independence as incompatible with the preference for
security in the neighbourhood of certainty...this led me to devise some counter-
examples. One of them, formulated in 1952, has become famous as the `Allais
Paradox'. Today, it is as widespread as its real meaning is generally misunder-
stood." (Allais, 2008, p. 4-5)
Research on decision making under uncertainty has a long tradition. A core of
tools designed to explore risky decisions has evolved, pinned down by the Savage (1954)
axioms and the expected utility (EU) framework. There are, however, a number of well-
documented departures from EU such as the Allais (1953) common consequence and
common ratio paradoxes whose featured `certainty eects' informed the development of
prospect theory (PT) (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
More recently, several authors have documented an `uncertainty eect' (Gneezy, List
and Wu, 2006; Simonsohn, 2009), incompatible with either PT or EU, where lotteries
are valued lower than the certainty of their worst possible outcome.
An organizing principle behind these important violations of expected utility is
that they seem to arise in situations where certainty and uncertainty are combined.
Indeed this is exactly the desired demonstration of the Allais Paradox.1 Allais (1953,
p. 530) argued that when two options are far from certain, individuals act eectively as
expected utility maximizers, while when one option is certain and another is uncertain
a disproportionate preference for certainty prevails.2
In few decision environments is the mix of certainty and uncertainty more prevalent
than intertemporal settings. The present is certain, while the future is inherently risky.
1The common consequence paradox became known as the `Allais paradox', and is presented prior
to the common ratio paradox in Allais (1953).
2Allais' intuition has at least partially carried through to economic experiments. In reviews of
the experimental literature, Camerer (1992); Harless and Camerer (1994); Starmer (2000) note that
violations of expected utility are less prevalent when all options are uncertain (i.e., on the interior of
the Marschak-Machina triangle).
1The discounted expected utility (DEU) model is the standard approach to addressing
decision-making in such contexts. Interestingly, there are relatively few noted violations
of the expected utility aspect of the DEU model.3
We document an important violation of expected utility in an intertemporal setting.
An implication of the standard DEU model is that intertemporal allocations should
depend only on relative intertemporal risk. For example, if sooner consumption will
be realized 50% of the time and later consumption will be realized 50% of the time,
intertemporal allocations should be identical to a situation where all consumption is
risk-free. This is because the two situations share a common ratio of probabilities.
In an experiment with 80 undergraduate subjects at the University of Califor-
nia, San Diego, we implement Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a) Convex Time Budgets
(CTBs) under varying risk conditions. With CTBs individuals are asked to allocate
a budget of experimental tokens to sooner and later payments. The relative value
of sooner versus later tokens determines the gross interest rate. CTB allocation deci-
sions are therefore equivalent to intertemporal optimization subject to a convex budget
constraint. Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a) show that preference parameters for both
discounting and utility function curvature are easily estimable from CTB allocations.
We implement CTBs in two baseline within-subject risk conditions: 1) A risk-free
condition where all payments, both sooner and later, will be paid 100% of the time;
and 2) a risky condition where, independently, sooner and later payments will be paid
only 50% of the time. Under the standard DEU model, CTB allocations in the two
conditions should be identical. The pattern of results clearly violates DEU and is
further inconsistent with non-EU concepts such as probability weighting (e.g., Tversky
3Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) document a number of anoma-
lies in the discounting aspect of discounted utility models. Machina (1989) demonstrates that non-EU
preferences generate dynamic inconsistencies and Halevy (2008) shows that hyperbolic discounting
can be reformulated in terms of non-EU probability weighting. The only evidence of intertemporal
violations of EU known to the authors is Baucells and Heukamp (2009) and Gneezy et al. (2006) who
show that temporal delay can generate an eect akin to the classic common ratio eect and that the
uncertainty eect is present for hypothetical intertemporal decisions, respectively.
2and Fox, 1995). In estimations of utility parameters, aggregate discounting is found to
be around 30% per year, close to the ndings of Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a), and
is virtually identical in both conditions. Interestingly, subjects exhibit almost linear
preferences in the risk-free rst condition, but substantial utility function curvature in
the risky second condition.
A foundational assumption in the construction of the DEU model is the assumption
that utility is continuous in probability. Continuity in probability implies that certain
and uncertain utility are functionally identical.4 We term this `interchangeability'.
The importance of interchangeability is clear: it implies that time-dated consump-
tion is evaluated using the same utility function whether this consumption is risky
or risk-free. The DEU violation we identify is more clearly viewed as a violation of
interchangeability. Our results suggest a real dierence between the utility parameters
that govern the evaluation of certain and uncertain outcomes.
To explore interchangeability in greater detail, we examine four additional experi-
mental conditions with dierential risk. In the rst two conditions one payment, either
sooner or later, is paid 50% of the time while the other is paid only 40% of the time.
Allais argued that in these situations, far from certainty, individuals should behave ap-
proximately as expected utility maximizers. Indeed they do. In two further conditions,
one payment is certain while the other is paid only 80% of the time. We demonstrate a
disproportionate preference for certain payments that is inconsistent with interchange-
ability, but can be readily resolved if certain and uncertain consumption are evaluated
using dierent preference parameters. The observed eects are closely in line with the
desired demonstration of the Allais paradox.
Our results have substantial implications for both experimental research on time
4Continuity dened over lotteries states that given any three lotteries in the domain of possible
lotteries with a preference ordering x1  x2  x3, there exists a probability, p 2 [0;1], such that
x2  px1+(1 p)x3. If no such p exists, then utility is discontinuous in probability. If certain and
uncertain utility are dierent and x2 is a certain outcome (degenerate lottery), then it is possible to
nd a set of three lotteries for which there will exist no probability mixture satisfying the denition
of continuity (see Andreoni and Sprenger (2009b) for discussion).
3and risk preferences and theoretical developments based on the DEU model. Specic
applications of our results can be made to hyperbolic discounting, the existence of
an uncertainty eect, the measurement of risk preferences, and the identication of
probability weighting. First, much attention has been given to dynamic inconsisten-
cies such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We demonstrate that the quasi-hyperbolic
pattern of discounting can be generated by dierential assessment of certain and un-
certain consumption, rather than that of present and future consumption. Second,
the existence of an uncertainty eect is impossible in both EU and PT.5 However, if
certain and uncertain consumption are evaluated with dierent utility parameters, the
uncertainty eect is no longer anomalous. Third, in the experimental measurement
of risk preferences, subjects are often asked to give certainty equivalents for uncertain
lotteries. Such methodology frequently generates extreme measures of risk aversion
at odds with standard EU theory (Rabin, 2000). Our results suggest that one could
potentially resolve this issue by allowing for dierential assessment of certain and un-
certain consumption. Fourth, probability weighting phenomena are generally identied
from certainty equivalents experiments similar to those employed to measure risk pref-
erences.6 Our results indicate that dierences between certain and uncertain utility
can generate probability weighting phenomena.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a conceptual development of
discounted expected utility, building to a testable hypothesis of decision making in
certain and uncertain situations. Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section
4 presents results and Section 5 is a discussion and conclusion.
5In fact the uncertainty eect will be at odds with any utility theory satisfying a betweenness
property (Camerer and Ho, 1994).
6For example, in Tversky and Fox (1995), subjects were asked to provide the certainty equivalent x
of a lottery with empirical probability p and payout y. Assuming a power utility function, v(x) = x,
with  = 0:88 obtained by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the authors then back out the probability
weight, (p) as the the value that solves x = (p)y.
42 Conceptual Background
The continuity-in-probability of expected utility frequently assumed in decision theory
implies that individuals assess certain consumption identically to uncertain consump-
tion. Let v(c) be some utility function for certain consumption and u(c) be a utility
function for uncertain consumption, assumed to be separable and linearly additive
over probabilistic states. Then accepted methodology relies on this assumption:
Assumption: Interchangeability. Individuals evaluate consumption, c, obtained
under certainty and uncertainty in an identical manner, that is u(c)  v(c).
When decisions are intertemporal and utility is time separable, interchangeability
gives rise to the standard DEU model:





where present consumption is certain while future consumption is both discounted and
uncertain. The expectation, E[], is taken via a standard linear-in-probabilities weight-




s=1 psu(ct+k;s). If all consumption
is certain, the expectation disappears:





If consumption at time t will be realized only with probability p1 while later consump-
tion will be realized with probability p2, utility is:





where Z represents a sum of discounted and linear probability-weighted v(0) terms.
5In this framework, we consider two risky prospects temporally separated by k peri-
ods. Let the rst prospect yield ct with probability p1 and zero otherwise. Let the sec-
ond prospect yield ct+k with probability p2 and zero otherwise. Assume 0  p1;p2  1.
Under the standard construction, utility is
p1v(ct) + p2
kv(ct+k) + ((1   p1) + (1   p2)
k)v(0):
Suppose an individual maximizes utility subject to the future value budget constraint
(1 + r)ct + ct+k = m;
yielding the marginal condition
v0(ct)
kv0(ct+k)




The tangency condition, in combination with the budget constraint, generally yields
solution functions of the form
ct = c
t(p1=p2;k;1 + r;m).
A key observation in this construction is that intertemporal allocations will depend
only on the relative risk, p1=p2, and not on p1 or p2 separately. If p1=p2 = 1, for
p1 = p2 < 1, then behavior should be identical to a risk-free situation. This is a
critical and testable implication of the DEU model.7
Hypothesis: For any (p1;p2) and (p0
1;p0








7Note that restricting discounting to be exponential is an unnecessary simplication. Discounting
could take a general form D(t;k) and the implication would be maintained.
6Readers will note this hypothesis is an intertemporal statement of the common
ratio property of expected utility. However, it is important to understand the degree
to which this common ratio hypothesis hinges upon interchangeability. If u(c) 6= v(c),
then there is no reason to expect c
t(p1=p2;k;1 + r;m) = c
t(1=1;k;1 + r;m) when
p1 = p2 < 1. This is because the marginal conditions in the two situations will
generally be satised at dierent allocation levels.8 Additionally, there is no reason
to expect c
t(p1=p2;k;1 + r;m) = c
t(p0
1=1;k;1 + r;m) when p1=p2 = p0
1 and p0
2 = 1 or
c
t(p1=p2;k;1 + r;m) = c
t(1=p0
2;k;1 + r;m) when p1=p2 = 1=p0
2 and p0
1 = 1.
In our later exposition it will be notationally convenient to use  to indicate the
risk adjusted gross interest rate:
 = (1 + r)
p2
p1




Provided that v0() > 0;v00() < 0, c
t will be increasing in p1=p2 and decreasing in 1+r.
As such, c
t will be decreasing in . Note, as well the income eect implication that, for
a given , c
t will be decreasing in 1+r. An increase in the interest rate will both raise
the relative price of sooner consumption and reduce the available consumption set.
3 Experimental Design
In order to explore the evaluation of certain and uncertain intertemporal consumption,
an experiment using Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a) Convex Time Budgets under vary-
8In the risky situation the marginal condition will be u0(ct)=ku0(ct+k) = (1 + r)p2=p1 = (1 + r),
while in the risk-free situation the condition will be: v0(c0
t)=kv0(c0
t+k) = (1 + r). And c0
t = ct;c0
t+k =
ct+k only if the marginal utility functions u0() and v0() are equal. Though this may occur with
u() 6= v(), it generally will not.
7ing risk conditions was conducted at the Univeristy of California, San Diego in April
of 2009. In each CTB decision, subjects were given a budget of experimental tokens
to be allocated across a sooner payment, paid at time t, and a later payment, paid at
time t + k; k > 0. Two basic CTB environments consisting of 7 allocation decisions
each were implemented under six dierent risk conditions. This generated a total of
84 experimental decisions for each subject.
3.1 CTB Design Features
Choice of t and k: Sooner payments in each decision were always seven days from
the experiment date (t = 7 days). We chose this `front-end-delay' to avoid any direct
impact of immediacy on decisions and to help eliminate dierential transactions costs
across sooner and later payments.9 In one of the basic CTB environments, later pay-
ments were delayed 28 days (k = 28) and in the other, later payments were delayed 56
days (k = 56). The choice of t and k combinations was determined by the academic
calendar. Payment dates were set to avoid holidays, school vacation days and nal
examination week. Payments were scheduled to arrive on the same day of the week (t
and k are both multiples of 7), to avoid dierential weekday eects.
Token Budgets and Interest Rates: In each CTB decision, subjects were given a
token budget of 100 tokens. Tokens allocated to the sooner experimental payment
had a value of at while tokens allocated to the later experimental payment had a
value of at+k. In all cases, at+k was $.20 per token and at varied from $.20 to $.14
per token. Note that at+k=at = (1 + r), the gross interest rate over k days, and
(1 + r)1=k   1 gives the standardized daily net interest rate. Daily net interest rates
in the experiment varied considerably across the basic budgets, from 0 to 1.3 percent,
implying annual interest rates of between 0 and 2100 percent (compounded quarterly).
9See below for the recruitment and payment eorts that allowed sooner payments to be imple-
mented in the same manner as later payments. For discussions of front-end-delays in time preference
experiments see Coller and Williams (1999); Harrison, Lau, Rutstrom and Williams (2005).
8Table 1 shows the token values, gross interest rates, standardized daily interest rates
and corresponding annual interest rates for the basic CTB budgets.
Table 1: Basic Convex Time Budget Decisions
t (start date) k (delay) Token Budget at at+k (1 + r) Daily Rate (%) Annual Rate (%)
7 28 100 0.2 0.2 1.00 0 0
7 28 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.18 85.7
7 28 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.38 226.3
7 28 100 0.17 0.2 1.18 0.58 449.7
7 28 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.80 796.0
7 28 100 0.15 0.2 1.33 1.03 1323.4
7 28 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 1.28 2116.6
7 56 100 0.2 0.2 1.00 0 0
7 56 100 0.19 0.2 1.05 0.09 37.9
7 56 100 0.18 0.2 1.11 0.19 88.6
7 56 100 0.17 0.2 1.18 0.29 156.2
7 56 100 0.16 0.2 1.25 0.40 246.5
7 56 100 0.15 0.2 1.33 0.52 366.9
7 56 100 0.14 0.2 1.43 0.64 528.0
Risk Conditions: The basic CTB decisions described above were implemented in
a total of six risk conditions. Let p1 and p2 be the probabilities that payment would
be made for the sooner and later payments, respectively. The six conditions were
(p1;p2) 2 f(1;1);(0:5;0:5);(1;0:8);(0:5;0:4);(0:8;1);(0:4;0:5)g. For each payment in-
volving uncertainty, a ten-sided die was rolled at the end of the experiment to determine
whether the payment would be sent or not. Hence, p1 and p2 were independent and
subjects were explained that dierent random numbers would determine their sooner
and later payments.10
The risk conditions have several features. To begin, the rst and second conditions
share a common ratio of p1=p2 = 1, the third and fourth conditions share a com-
mon ratio of p1=p2 = 1:25, and the fth and sixth conditions share a common ratio
of p1=p2 = 0:8. Discounted expected utility predicts identical behavior across each
10See Appendix A.3 for the payment instructions provided to subjects.
9pair of conditions. Additionally, all of the odd conditions feature at least one certain
payment, while all of the even conditions feature only uncertainty. If there exists a
disproportionate preference for certainty, it should become apparent in cross-condition
comparisons. That is, subjects should disproportionately prefer the sooner payment
when it is certain in the third condition and the later payment when it is certain in the
fth condition. Lastly, across conditions the sooner payment goes from being relatively
less risky, p1=p2 = 1:25, to relatively more risky, p1=p2 = 0:8. Following the discussion
of Section 2, subjects should respond to changes in relative risk, allocating smaller
amounts to sooner payments when relative risk is low.
3.2 Implementation and Protocol
One of the most challenging aspects of implementing any time discounting study is
making all choices equivalent except for their timing. That is, transactions costs as-
sociated with receiving payments, including physical costs and condence, must be
equalized across all time periods. We took several unique steps in our subject recruit-
ment process and our payment procedure in order to equate transaction costs over
time.
3.2.1 Recruitment and Experimental Payments
In order to participate in the experiment, subjects were required to live on campus.
All campus residents are provided with an individual mailbox at their dormitory to use
for USPS and campus mail. Each mailbox is locked and individuals have keyed access
24 hours per day. We recruited 80 undergraduate students tting this criterion.
All payments, both sooner and later, were placed in subjects' campus mailboxes,
which allowed us to equate physical transaction costs across sooner and later payments.
Subjects were fully informed of the method of payment.11
11See Appendix A.2 for the information provided to subjects.
10Several other unique measures were also taken to equate transaction costs. Upon
beginning the experiment, subjects were told that they would receive a $10 minimum
payment for participating, to be received in two payments: $5 sooner and $5 later.
All experimental earnings were added to these $5 minimum payments. Two blank
envelopes were provided. After receiving directions about the two minimum payments,
subjects addressed the envelopes to themselves at their campus mailbox. At the end of
the experiment, subjects wrote their payment amounts and dates on the inside ap of
each envelope such that they would see the amounts written in their own handwriting
when payments arrived.
One choice for each subject was chosen for payment by drawing a numbered card
at random. All experimental payments were made by personal check from Professor
James Andreoni drawn on an account at the university credit union.12 Subjects were
informed that they could cash their checks (if they so desired) at the university credit
union. They were also given the business card of Professor James Andreoni and told
to call or email him if a payment did not arrive and that a payment would be hand-
delivered immediately.
3.2.2 Instrument and Protocol
The experiment was done with paper and pencil. Upon entering the lab subjects were
read an introduction with detailed information on the payment process and a sample
decision with dierent payment dates, token values and payment risks than those used
in the experiment.13 Subjects were informed that they would work through 6 decision
tasks. Each task consisted of 14 CTB decisions: seven with t = 7; k = 28 on one
12Payment choice was guided by a separate survey of N = 249 undergraduate economics students
eliciting payment preferences. Personal checks from Professor Andreoni, Amazon.com gift cards,
PayPal transfers and the university stored value system TritonCash were each compared to cash
payments. Subjects were asked if they would prefer a twenty dollar payment made via each payment
method or $X cash, where X was varied from 19 to 10. Personal check payments were found to have
the highest cash equivalent value.
13See Appendix A.3 for introductory text, instructions and examples.
11sheet and seven with t = 7; k = 56 on a second sheet. Each decision sheet featured
a calendar, highlighting the experiment date, and the sooner and later payment dates,
allowing subjects to visualize the payment dates and delay lengths.
Figure 1 shows a sample decision sheet. Identical instructions were read at the
beginning of each task providing payment dates and the chance of being paid for each
decision. Subjects were provided with a calculator and a calculation sheet transforming
tokens to payments amounts at various token values.
Four sessions were conducted over two days. Two orders of risk conditions were
implemented to examine order eects.14 Each day consisted of an early session (12
pm) and a late session (2 pm). The early session on the rst day and the late session
on the second day share a common order as do the late session on the rst day and
the early session on the second day. No identiable order or session eects were found
(see Section 4.1).
14In one order, (p1;p2) followed the sequence (1;1);(1;0:8);(0:8;1);(0:5;0:5);(0:5;0:4);(0:4;0:5),









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The results are presented in two broad sections. First, we examine behavior in the two
baseline conditions: (p1;p2) = (1;1) and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5). We document a critical
violation of the DEU model and show that the pattern of results is generally incompat-
ible with various probability weighting concepts. In estimates of utility parameters, we
show clear dierences between the utility functions for certain and uncertain consump-
tion. Second, we explore behavior in two further contexts: one where all payments
are uncertain, but there is dierential risk; and another where one payment is certain
while the other is uncertain. We demonstrate a pattern of behavior consistent with
the notion that individuals behave as expected utility maximizers away from certainty
but exhibit a disproportionate preference for certainty when it is available.
4.1 Behavior Under Certainty and Uncertainty
Section 2 provided a testable hypothesis for behavior across certain and uncertain
intertemporal settings. For a given (p1;p2), if p1 = p2 < 1 then behavior should be
identical to a similarly dated risk-free prospect, (p1 = p2 = 1), at all gross interest
rates, 1 + r, and all delay lengths, k.15 Figure 2 graphs aggregate behavior for the
conditions (p1;p2) = (1;1) and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5) across the experimentally varied
gross interest rates and delay lengths. The mean earlier choice of ct is graphed along
with error bars corresponding to 95 percent condence intervals (+=  1.96 standard
errors).
Under the DEU model, behavior should be identical across the two conditions. We
nd strong evidence to the contrary. In a hypothesis test of equality across the two
conditions, the overall dierence is found to be highly signicant: F14;2212 = 15:66; p <
:001.16
15We ignore m because the experimental budget was held constant across all choices.
16Test statistic generated after analysis of variance with 2240 observations (28 per subject  80
subjects) controlling for levels of interest rate (6 degrees of freedom), delay length (1 d.f), (interest




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The gure presents aggregate behavior for N = 80 subjects under two conditions:
(p1;p2) = (1;1), i.e. no risk, in blue; and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5), i.e. 50% chance sooner
payment would be sent and 50% chance later payment would be sent, in red. t = 7 days
in all cases, k 2 f28;56g days. Error bars represent 95% condence intervals, taken
as +=   1:96 standard errors of the mean. Test of H0 : Equality across conditions:
F14;2212 = 15:66; p < :001.
Stylistically, the data follow an interesting pattern. Behavior in both (p1;p2) =
(1;1) and (0:5;0:5) conditions respect increasing interest rates. Allocations to sooner
payments decrease as interest rates rise. At low interest rates, ct allocations are sub-
rate)  (delay length) (6 d.f) and (risk condition)  (interest rate)  (delay length) (14 d.f). 2240 -
6 - 1 - 6 - 14 - 1(constant) = 2212 d.f. The F-test corresponds to testing the null hypotheses that the
14 (risk condition)  (interest rate)  (delay length) terms have zero explanatory power. ANOVA
results available on request.
15stantially higher in the (1;1) condition. However, as the gross interest rate increases,
(1;1) allocations drop steeply, crossing over the graph of the (0:5;0:5) condition.17 This
cross-over in behavior is particularly puzzling from a classical decision theory perspec-
tive and is in clear violation of discounted expected utility. Though this is suggestive
evidence against interchangeability, we must rst consider possible alternative expla-
nations. Principal among these is Prospect Theory and, in particular, the existence of
probability weighting (Tversky and Fox, 1995).
Probability weighting states that individuals `edit' probabilities internally via a
weighting function, (p). (p) is monotonically increasing in the interval [0;1], but
is S-shaped, such that low probabilities are up-weighted and high probabilities are
down-weighted. Standard probability weighting is unable to explain the phenomena
observed in Figure 2. If p1 = p2, then (p1) = (p2); (p1)=(p2) = 1 and behavior
should again be identical to a risk-free situation.
Another potential explanation is that probabilities are weighted by their temporal
proximity (Halevy, 2008). Under this formulation, subjective probabilities are arrived
at through some temporally dependent function g(p;t) : [0;1]  <+ ! [0;1] where
t represents the time at which payments will be made. Provided freedom to pick
the functional form of g() one could easily arrive at dierences between the ratios
g(1;t)=g(1;t + k) and g(0:5;t)=g(0:5;t + k).18
These dierences lead to a new risk adjusted interest rate similar to the  dened
17This dierence in allocations across conditions is obtained for all sessions and for all orders indi-
cating no presence of order or day eects. Results available on request.












provided g() does not take on identical values at 0:5t and 0:5t+k. If one further assumes g() is strictly

















Note that either ~ 1;1 > ~ 0:5;0:5 for all (1+r) or ~ 1;1 < ~ 0:5;0:5 for all (1+r), depending on
the form of g() chosen. As such, once one obtains a prediction as to the relationship
between ~ 1;1 and ~ 0:5;0:5, it must hold for all gross interest rates.
Provided a concave utility function, ct allocations should be decreasing in ~ . As
such, one should never observe the cross-over in behavior where for one gross interest
rate ct allocations are higher when (p1;p2) = (1;1) and for another gross interest rate ct
allocations are higher when (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5). This cross-over, which is observed in
our data, is not consistent with temporally dependent probability weighting of the form
proposed by Halevy (2008). Given the freedom granted in choosing the function g(),
even some hybrid of temporally dependent weighting and probability editing would be
generally unable to generate this switch in behavior.
4.1.1 Estimating Risk-Dependent Preferences
The observed data in the cases of (p1;p2) = (1;1) and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5) are in-
consistent with the interchangeability assumption of the DEU model and are dicult
to reconcile with notions of probability weighting. Whereas allocations of ct when
(p1;p2) = (1;1) vary substantially with the interest rate, the sensitivity of allocations
to interest rates is lower when (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5).
The sensitivity of intertemporal allocations to interest rates, that is the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution, is generally determined by both time preferences and
utility function curvature. Our experimental design allows us to identify and, given
some structural assumptions, estimate both discounting and curvature. Following the
methodology outlined in Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a), we assume the utility function
v(ct) = (ct   !)
;
17where  represents utility function curvature and ! is a background parameter that
could be interpreted as Stone-Geary minima.19 Under this formulation of the DEU
model, the solution function c












































We estimate the parameters of this function via non-linear least squares with stan-
dard errors clustered on the individual level to obtain ^ ; ^  and ^ !. An estimate of
the annual discount rate is generated as 1=^ 365  1, with corresponding standard error
obtained via the delta method.
Table 2 presents discounting and curvature parameters estimated from the two
conditions (p1;p2) = (1;1) and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5). In column (1), we estimate a
baseline model where discounting and curvature are restricted to be identical across
the two risk conditions. The aggregate discount rate is estimated to be around 27%
per year and aggregate curvature is estimated to be 0.98.
In column (2) we estimate separate discounting and curvature parameters for the
two risk conditions. That is, we estimate a risk-free v() and a risky u(). Discounting
is found to be similar across the conditions at around 30% per year.20 In the risk-
free condition, (p1;p2) = (1;1), we nd almost linear utility while in the the risky
condition, (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5), we estimate utility to be markedly more concave. A
similar result is observed in column (3) where discounting is restricted to be the same
19Frequently in the time preference literature, the simplication ! = 0 is imposed or ! is interpreted
as negative background consumption and calculated from an external data source. In Andreoni and
Sprenger (2009a) we show the sensitivity of parameter estimates to these simplications.
20For comparison, Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a) nd aggregate discount rate between 30-37% and
aggregate curvature of around 0.92 in risk-free situations.





^ (1;1) 0.988 0.988
(0.002) (0.002)
^ (0:5;0:5) 0.885 0.883
(0.017) (0.017)






^ ! 3.608 2.417 2.414
(0.339) (0.418) (0.418)
R2 0.642 0.673 0.673
N 2240 2240 2240
Clusters 80 80 80
Notes: NLS solution function estimators. Subscripts
refer to (p1;p2) condition. Column (1) imposes the IA,
v() = u(). Column (2) allows dierent curvature and
dierent discounting in each (p1;p2) condition. Col-
umn (3) allows only dierent curvature in each each
(p1;p2) condition. Annual discount rate calculates as
(1=^ )365   1, standard errors calculated via the delta
method.
across risk conditions. Hypotheses of equal utility function curvature across conditions
are rejected in both specications: F1;79 = 37:97; p < :001; F1;79 = 38:09; p < :001,
respectively. To illustrate how well these estimates t the data, Figure 2 also displays
solid lines corresponding to predicted behavior based on the parameters estimated in
column (3). The general pattern of aggregate responses is well matched.21
21Figure 2 additionally reports separate R2 values for the two conditions: R2
1;1 = 0:594; R2
0:5;0:5 =
0:761, indicating that the solution function estimation approach does an adequate job of tting the
aggregate data. For comparison a simple linear regression of ct on the levels of interest rates, delay
lengths and their interaction in each condition would produce ~ R2 values of ~ R2
1;1 = 0:443; ~ R2
0:5;0:5 =
0:346.
19Figure 3: Estimated Utility Function Curvature Under Certainty and Uncertainty




















(p1, p2) = (1,1) Estimated Utility (v)
(p1, p2) = (0.5, 0.5) Estimated Utility (u)
Note: The gure presents estimated utility functions (corresponding to the estimates of Table 2,
column (5): c^ . Dotted lines represent 95% condence intervals. c = 20 corresponds to the value of
later payments in the experiment.
Though discounting is estimated to be similar across conditions, substantial dif-
ference in curvature is estimated between (p1;p2) = (1;1) and (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5).
Figure 3 demonstrates the economic importance of this result, plotting the two esti-
mated utility functions along with 95% condence intervals of the estimates. While
utility deviates only slightly from linear preferences when (p1;p2) = (1;1), the devia-
20tion is sizeable when (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5), even over the monetary values used in the
experiment.
These results are suggestive evidence against the interchangeability assumption.
Our estimations indicate that certain and uncertain payments are evaluated using
dierent utility functions.
4.2 Behavior with Dierential Risk
In this section we analyze behavior in conditions with dierential risk. First, we exam-
ine conditions where all payments are uncertain but sooner and later payments dier
in their level of risk. Second, we examine two hybrid conditions where one payment is
certain while the other is uncertain.
4.2.1 When All Choices Are Uncertain
The individual's marginal condition under DEU establishes a tradeo between relative
risk, p1=p2, and the gross interest rate, 1+r. This tradeo is captured in the variable ,
the risk adjusted interest rate. As noted in Section 2, given a concave utility function, ct
allocations should be increasing in the relative risk and decreasing in the gross interest
rate. As such, ct allocations should also decreasing in . Additionally, for a given 
across situations, ct allocations will be higher where the gross interest rate is lower.
Figure 4 presents aggregate behavior from three risky situtations: (p1;p2) =
(0:5;0:5) (in red); (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4) (in green); and (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5) (in or-
ange) over the experimentally varied values of  and delay length. The mean earlier
choice of ct is graphed along with error bars corresponding to 95 percent condence
intervals. We also plot predicted behavior based on the aggregate responses in the
(p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5) condition. That is, based on ^ 0:5;0:5; ^  and ^ ! estimated in Table 2,
column (3), we predict out of sample behavior for the two conditions (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4)
and (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5). These predictions are plotted as solid lines in green and or-
21ange.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The gure presents aggregate behavior for N = 80 subjects under three condi-
tions: (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5), i.e. equal risk, in red; (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4), i.e. more risk
later, in green; and (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5), i.e. more risk sooner, in orange. Error bars rep-
resent 95% condence intervals, taken as += 1:96 standard errors of the mean. Solid
lines correspond to predicted behavior using utility estimates from (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5)
as estimated in Table 2, column (3).
We highlight two dimensions of Figure 4. First, the theoretical predictions are 1)
that ct should be declining in ; and 2) that if two decisions have identical  then
ct should be higher in the condition with the lower interest rate. These features are
observed in the data. Allocations of ct decline with  and, where overlap of  exists ct
22is generally higher for lower gross interest rates.22 Second, out of sample predictions
match actual aggregate behavior. Indeed, the out-of-sample calculated R2 values are
high: 0.878 for (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4) and 0.580 for (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5).23
Figure 4 demonstrates that in situations where all payments are risky, utility pa-
rameters measured under uncertainty describe behavior extremely well. That is, away
from certainty, subjects act as expected utility maximizers, trading o relative risk and
interest rates as predicted by the DEU model.
4.2.2 Dierential Curvature: A Preference for Certainty
When all options are uncertain, individuals appear to recognize the trade-o between
relative risk and interest rates. The results demonstrated in Figure 4 are in line with
both Allais' intuition and prior work on the identication of EU violations when all
options are uncertain (Harless and Camerer, 1994; Camerer and Ho, 1994). Inter-
changeability, however, requires that the same trade-os between relative risk and
interest rates be made when one option is certain. In particular, interchangeabil-
ity requires that behavior when (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4) be identical to behavior when
(p1;p2) = (1;0:8), and that behavior when (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5) be identical to behavior
when (p1;p2) = (0:8;1). These conditions share common ratios of p1=p2.
Figure 5 graphs behavior in these four conditions, demonstrating that allocations
when all payments are risky dier dramatically from allocations where some payments
are certain.24 Hypotheses of equality across conditions are rejected in both cases.25
Subjects show a disproportionate preference for certainty when it is available. This
22This pattern of allocations is obtained for all sessions and for all orders indicating no presence of
order or day eects. Results available on request.
23By comparison, making similar out of sample predictions using utility estimates from (p1;p2) =
(1;1) yields predictions that diverge dramatically from actual behavior (see Figure A1) and lowers R2
values to 0.767 and 0.462, respectively. This suggests that accounting for dierential utility function
curvature in risky situations allows for an improvement of t on the order of 15-25%.
24This dierence in allocations across conditions is obtained for all sessions and for all orders indi-
cating no presence of order or day eects. Results available on request.
25For equality across (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4) and (p1;p2) = (1;0:8), F14;2212 = 14:60; p < :001 and for
equality across (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5) and (p1;p2) = (0:8;1), F14;2212 = 23:82; p < :001
23result follows naturally from our Table 2 estimates, which show that utility function
curvature is markedly more pronounced in uncertain situations relative to certain situ-
ations. Stated dierently, the marginal utility of consumption is estimated to be higher
under certainty. This higher marginal utility translates into a dierential preference
for certainty when it is available.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The gure presents aggregate behavior for N = 80 subjects under four condi-
tions: (p1;p2) = (1;0:8), (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4), (p1;p2) = (0:8;1) and (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5).
Error bars represent 95% condence intervals, taken as +=   1:96 standard errors of
the mean. The rst and second conditions share a common ratio as do the third and
fourth. Test of H0 : Equality across conditions 1 and 2: F14;2212 = 14:60; p < :001.
Test of H0 : Equality across conditions 3 and 4: F14;2212 = 23:82; p < :001.
To explore the inuence of combined certainty and uncertainty on experimental
24responses, Figure 6 plots aggregate behavior in three conditions: (p1;p2) = (1;1) (in
blue); (p1;p2) = (1;0:8) (in gray); and (p1;p2) = (0:8;1) (in purple) over the experi-
mentally varied values of  and delay length. The mean earlier choice of ct is graphed
along with error bars corresponding to 95 percent condence intervals.
Under interchangeability Figure 6 should be identical to Figure 4. Unlike the nd-
ings of Figure 4, ct allocations are not uniformly decreasing in . Additionally, lower
interest rates do not generally lead to higher ct allocations when  is equal across
conditions.
The cross-over in allocations across the (p1;p2) = (1;0:8) and (p1;p2) = (1;1) con-
ditions is particularly striking. When  = 1, ct allocations are higher in the (1;1)
condition, while at larger values of , ct allocations are higher in the (1;0:8) condi-
tion. Such behavior is at odds with EU theory and cannot be explained by non-EU
probability weighting.26 Behavior in the (p1;p2) = (0:8;1) condition seems to t better
with the (p1;p2) = (1;1) condition, however, allocations are generally quite low in this
region, precluding strong inference.27
In Figure 6 we also plot predicted behavior based on the estimates of Table 2,
column (3). The prediction is made under the assumption that certain consumption is
evaluated using ^ 1;1 and uncertain consumption is evaluated using ^ 0:5;0:5. We predict
out of sample for the conditions (p1;p2) = (1;0:8) and (p1;p2) = (0:8;1).28 These
predictions are plotted as solid lines in gray and purple.
Though the behavior illustrated in Figure 6 is at odds with interchangeability, its
stylistic properties are easily explained if we allow uncertain and certain consumption to
be governed by dierent utility functions. The solid lines show exactly this eect. The
cross-over in behavior between the (p1;p2) = (1;0:8) and (p1;p2) = (1;1) conditions is
26The argument is identical to the one presented in Section 4.1.
27This pattern of allocations is obtained for all sessions and for all orders indicating no presence of
order or day eects. Results available on request.
28One does not arrive at an analytic solution function for c
t in these hybrid cases. Instead ct is
solved for as the root of a polynomial function. See Appendix A.4 for the solution procedure.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Note: The gure presents aggregate behavior for N = 80 subjects under three con-
ditions: (p1;p2) = (1;1), i.e. equal risk, in blue; (p1;p2) = (1;0:8), i.e. more risk
later, in green; and (p1;p2) = (0:8;1), i.e. more risk sooner, in orange. Error bars
represent 95% condence intervals, taken as +=   1:96 standard errors of the mean.
`Hybrid Prediction' lines correspond to predicted behavior using utility estimates from
(p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5) for uncertain payments and (p1;p2) = (1;1) for certain payments
as estimated in Table 2, column (3).
predicted and the out of sample R2 value of 0.854 for the (p1;p2) = (1;0:8) condition
is notably high. Behavior when (p1;p2) = (0:8;1) is predicted to piece together with
behavior when (p1;p2) = (1;1), though the out of sample R2 value of 0.133 is notably
low.
In sum, the data and corresponding estimations strongly indicate that separate
26utility parameters govern the assessment of certain and uncertain consumption. Un-
certain utility is able to predict behavior well in uncertain situations, where subjects
act eectively as expected utility maximizers. However, subjects exhibit a preference
for certainty when it is available. This behavior follows naturally from the nding
that certain consumption has lower utility function curvature and so higher marginal
utility than uncertain consumption. Indeed in hybrid situations where some payments
are certain and others are not, this dierence in utility parameters is able to explain
behavior that is at odds with both standard DEU and PT theories. Finding dierences
between certain and uncertain utility parameters has broad applications in decision
theory. In our discussion, we sketch several applications.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Intertemporal decision-making involves a combination of certainty and uncertainty.
The present is known while the future is inherently risky. Though expected utility (EU)
violations are frequently found in decision environments combining risk and certainty,
there are few known violations of the EU aspect of discounted expected utility. In an
experiment using Andreoni and Sprenger (2009a) Convex Time Budgets under varying
risk conditions, we document an important violation of discounted expected utility. The
violation we document is more closely a violation of what we term interchangeability, or
the notion that certain and uncertain consumption are assessed using identical utility
parameters.
Our ndings indicate that certain and uncertain consumption are evaluated very
dierently. Substantially less utility function curvature is associated with certain con-
sumption relative to uncertain consumption. Additionally, individuals behave approxi-
mately as expected utility maximizers in uncertain situations, but exhibit a dispropor-
tionate preference for certainty when it is available. We interpret our ndings as being
consistent with both prior research on expected utility violations and the intuition of
27the Allais Paradox (Allais, 1953).
Demonstrating a dierence between certain and uncertain utility has substantial
impacts for decision theory. We highlight applications in four domains: 1) quasi-
hyperbolic discounting; 2) the `uncertainty eect'; 3) the measurement of risk prefer-
ences; and 4) the identication of probability weighting.
First, dynamic inconsistencies such as quasi-hyperbolic discounting are frequently
documented (for a review, see Frederick, Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 2002). Re-
cently, the hallmark of dynamic inconsistency, diminishing impatience through time,
has been argued to be generated by dierential risk on present and future payments (for
psychological evidence, see Keren and Roelofsma, 1995; Weber and Chapman, 2005).
Halevy (2008) argues that dierential risk leads to dynamic inconsistency because in-
dividuals have a temporally dependent probability weighting function that is convex
(see Section 4.1 for details). Our results suggest that one need not call on a com-
plex probability weighting function to explain the phenomenon. If individuals exhibit
a disproportionate preference for certainty when it is available, then present, certain
consumption will be disproportionately favored over future, uncertain consumption.
When only uncertain future consumption is considered, the disproportionate prefer-
ence for certainty is not active and apparent present-biased preference reversals can be
generated.
Second, the `uncertainty eect', in which a lottery is valued lower than the certainty
of its worst possible outcome, is at odds with a number of utility theories, including
both expected utility and prospect theory (Gneezy et al., 2006; Simonsohn, 2009). Our
results provide a simple resolution. If uncertain and certain consumption are assessed
with dierent utility parameters, then the uncertainty eect is a comparison of two
values: the expected utility of an uncertain gamble and the certain utility of its worst
outcome. If, as we nd, uncertain utility is more concave than certain utility one could
well expect a gamble to be valued lower than its worst possible outcome. For example,
28consider the standard uncertainty eect, comparing a 50-50 lottery paying $50 or $100
to the certainty of $50. Let certain consumption be evaluated with CRRA utility and
a curvature parameter of 0:99 and let the lottery options be evaluated under expected
CRRA utility with a curvature parameter of 0:88, as found in our estimates. The
utility of the lottery is given as UL = 0:5500:88 +0:51000:88 = 44:41. The utility of
the certain $50 is given as UC = 500:99 = 48:08, demonstrating the uncertainty eect
of valuing a lottery lower than its worst outcome.
Third, risk preferences are frequently measured using certainty equivalence tech-
niques. Such methodology frequently generates extreme measures of risk aversion at
odds with standard EU theory via a calibration theorem (Rabin, 2000). A standard
CRRA curvature parameter nding in such low stakes experiments is between 0.5 and
0.6.29 Our results suggest that a potential issue with these ndings is the dierential
assessment of certain and uncertain consumption. Consider asking an individual to
provide the certainty equivalent of a 50-50 lottery paying out $50 or $0. Let certain
and uncertain consumption be evaluated as before. Normalizing u(0) = 0, we have:
C0:99 = 0:5  500:88, yielding a certainty equivalent of C = 16:07. If we assumed a
single curvature parameter, a, and found the a that rationalizes 16:07a = 0:5  50a,
we would solve for a = 0:61. As such, dierential curvature for certain and uncertain
consumption may help to explain the extremely high levels of risk aversion obtained in
certainty equivalent experiments.
Fourth, experiments demonstrating prospect theory probability weighting also use
certainty equivalence techniques (see Tversky and Fox, 1995). Following a similar logic
to above, one can assume a curvature value, for example a = 0:88 (as in Tversky and
Fox, 1995), and examine the probability weight (p) that rationalizes C0:88 = (p) 
29In the auction literature mention is made of `square root utility' where   0:5. Holt and Laury
(2002) discuss several relevant willingness to pay results from the auction literature in line with this
value. Interestingly, Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) present evidence on both willingness to pay
and willingness to accept values for lotteries. Though the curvature implied from willingness to
pay certainty equivalents is around 0.6, the curvature from willingness to accept treatments actually
suggests risk-loving behavior.
29500:88 at various probabilities. For example, at p = 0:95 under our parameter values,
we would obtain C = 30:73 and a corresponding probability weight of (0:95) = 0:652,
demonstrating down-weighting of high probability events. And at p = 0:01, we would
obtain C = 0:31 and a probability weight of (0:01) = 0:013, demonstrating a slight
up-weighting of low probability events. Though this is far from the results obtained in
probability weighting experiments, it suggests that probability weighting of objective
probabilistic events may be conated with dierential utility for certain and uncertain
consumption.
The experiment presented here demonstrates that the DEU model can predict ex-
perimental behavior extremely well away from certainty. The standard DEU model
breaks down if we accept, as Allais suggested, that individuals have a disproportion-
ate preference for certainty when it is available. The brief applications of our central
ndings provide further evidence. Future research should attempt to work through
these issues in both intertemporal and static decision contexts as well as examine wel-
fare eects and policy implications of dierential utility over certain and uncertain
consumption.
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Note: The gure presents aggregate behavior for N = 80 subjects under three condi-
tions: 1) (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:5), i.e. equal risk, in red; 2) (p1;p2) = (0:5;0:4), i.e. more
risk later, in green; and 3) (p1;p2) = (0:4;0:5), i.e. more risk sooner, in orange. Er-
ror bars represent 95% condence intervals, taken as +=   1:96 standard errors of the
mean. Blue solid lines correspond to predicted behavior using utility estimates from
(p1;p2) = (1;1) as estimated in Table 2, column (3).
34A.2 Welcome Text
Welcome and thank you for participating.
Eligibility for this study: To be in this study, you need to meet these criteria. You
must have a campus mailing address of the form:
YOUR NAME
9450 GILMAN DR 92(MAILBOX NUMBER)
LA JOLLA CA 92092-(MAILBOX NUMBER)
Your mailbox must be a valid way for you to receive mail from now through the
end of the Spring Quarter.
You must be willing to provide your name, campus mail box, email address, and
student PID. This information will only be seen by Professor Andreoni and his assis-
tants. After payment has been sent, this information will be destroyed. Your identity
will not be a part of any subsequent data analysis.
You must be willing to receive your payment for this study by check, written to
you by Professor James Andreoni, Director of the UCSD Economics Laboratory. The
checks will be drawn on the USE Credit Union on campus. You may deposit or cash
your check wherever you like. If you wish, you can cash your checks for free at the USE
Credit Union any weekday from 9:00 am to 5:00 pm with valid identication (drivers
license, passport, etc.).
The checks will be delivered to you at your campus mailbox at a date to be de-
termined by your decisions in this study, and by chance. The latest you could receive
payment is the last week of classes in the Spring Quarter.
If you do not meet all of these criteria, please inform us of this now.
35A.3 Instruction and Examples Script
Earning Money:
To begin, you will be given a $10 minimum payment. You will receive this payment
in two payments of $5 each. The two $5 minimum payments will come to you at two
dierent times. These times will be determined in the way described below. Whatever
you earn from the study today will be added to these minimum payments.
In this study, you will make 84 choices over how to allocate money between two
points in time, one time is `earlier' and one is `later'. Both the earlier and later times
will vary across decisions. This means you could be receiving payments as early as
one week from today, and as late as the last week of classes in the Spring Quarter, or
possibly other dates in between.
It is important to note that the payments in this study involve chance. There is a
chance that your earlier payment, your later payment or both will not be sent at all.
For each decision, you will be fully informed of the chance involved for the sooner and
later payments. Whether or not your payments will be sent will be determined at the
END of the experiment today. If, by chance, one of your payments is not sent, you will
receive only the $5 minimum payment.
Once all 84 decisions have been made, we will randomly select one of the 84
decisions as the decision-that-counts. This will be done in three stages. First, we will
pick a number from 1 to 84 at random to determine which is the decision-that-counts
and the corresponding sooner and later payment dates. Then we will pick a second
number at random from 1 to 10 to determine if the sooner payment will be sent. Then
we will pick a third number at random from 1 to 10 to determine if the later payment
will be sent. We will use the decision-that-counts to determine your actual earnings.
Note, since all decisions are equally likely to be chosen, you should make each decision
as if it will be the decision-that-counts. When calculating your earnings from the
decision-that-counts, we will add to your earnings the two $5 minimum payments.
36Thus, you will always get paid at least $5 at the chosen earlier time, and at least $5
at the chosen later time.
IMPORTANT: All payments you receive will arrive to your campus mailbox. On
the scheduled day of payment, a check will be placed for delivery in campus mail
services by Professor Andreoni and his assistants. Campus mail services guarantees
delivery of 100% of your payments by the following day.
As a reminder to you, the day before you are scheduled to receive one of your
payments, we will send you an e-mail notifying you that the payment is coming. On
your table is a business card for Professor Andreoni with his contact information.
Please keep this in a safe place. If one of your payments is not received you should
immediately contact Professor Andreoni, and we will hand-deliver payment to you.
Your Identity:
In order to receive payment, we will need to collect the following pieces of in-
formation from you: name, campus mail box, email address, and student PID. This
information will only be seen by Professor Andreoni and his assistants. After all pay-
ments have been sent, this information will be destroyed. Your identity will not be a
part of subsequent data analysis.
On your desk are two envelopes: one for the sooner payment and one for the later
payment. Please take the time now to address them to yourself at your campus mail
box.
How it Works:
In each decision you are asked to divide 100 tokens between two payments at two
dierent dates: Payment A (which is sooner) and Payment B (which is later). Tokens
will be exchanged for money. The tokens you allocate to Payment B (later) will always
37be worth at least as much as the tokens you allocate to Payment A (sooner). The
process is best described by an example. Please examine the sample sheet in you
packet marked SAMPLE.
The sample sheet provided is similar to the type of decision sheet you will ll out in
the study. The sample sheet shows the choice to allocate 100 tokens between Payment
A on April 17th and Payment B on May 1st. Note that today's date is highlighted in
yellow on the calendar on the left hand side. The earlier date (April 17th) is marked
in green and the later date (May 1st) is marked in blue. The earlier and later dates
will always be marked green and blue in each decision you make. The dates are also
indicated in the table on the right.
In this decision, each token you allocate to April 17th is worth $0.10, while each
token you allocate to May 1st is worth $0.15. So, if you allocate all 100 tokens to
April 17th, you would earn 100x$0.10 = $10 (+ $5 minimum payment) on this date
and nothing on May 1st (+ $5 minimum payment). If you allocate all 100 tokens to
May 1st, you would earn 100x$0.15 = $15 (+ $5 minimum payment) on this date and
nothing on April 17th (+ $5 minimum payment). You may also choose to allocate
some tokens to the earlier date and some to the later date. For instance, if you allocate
62 tokens to April 17th and 38 tokens to May 1st, then on April 17th you would earn
62x$0.10 = $6.20 (+ $5 minimum payment) and on May 1st you would earn 38x$0.15
= $5.70 (+ $5 minimum payment). In your packet is a Payo Table showing some of
the token-dollar exchange at all relevant token exchange rates.
REMINDER: Please make sure that the total tokens you allocate between Payment
A and Payment B sum to exactly 100 tokens. Feel free to use the calculator provided
in making your allocations and making sure your total tokens add to exactly 100 in
each row.
Chance of Receiving Payments:
38Each decision sheet also lists the chances that each payment is sent. In this example
there is a 70% chance that Payment A will actually be sent and a 30% chance that
Payment B will actually be sent. In each decision we will inform you of the chance that
the payments will be sent. If this decision were chosen as the decision-that-counts we
would determine the actual payments by throwing two ten sided die, one for Payment
A and one for Payment B.
EXAMPLE: Let's consider the person who chose to allocate 62 tokens to April
17th and 38 tokens to May 1st. If this were the decision-that-counts we would then
throw a ten-sided die for Payment A. If the die landed on 1,2,3,4,5,6,or 7, the person's
Payment A would be sent and she would receive $6.20 (+ $5 minimum payment) on
April 17th. If the die landed 8,9, or 10, the payment would not be sent and she would
receive only the $5 minimum payment on April 17th. Then we would throw a second
ten-sided die for Payment B. If the die landed 1,2, or 3, the person's Payment B would
be sent and she would receive $5.70 (+ $5 minimum payment) on May 1st. If the die
landed 4,5,6,7,8,9, or 10, the payment would not be sent and she would receive only
the $5 minimum payment on May 1st.
Things to Remember:
 You will always be allocating exactly 100 tokens.
 Tokens you allocate to Payment A (sooner) and Payment B (later) will be ex-
changed for money at dierent rates. The tokens you allocate to Payment B will
always be worth at least as much as those you allocate to Payment A.
 Payment A and Payment B will have varying degrees of chance. You will be fully
informed of the chances.
 On each decision sheet you will be asked 7 questions. For each decision you will
allocate 100 tokens. Allocate exactly 100 tokens for each decision row, no more,
39no less.
 At the end of the study a random number will be drawn to determine which
is the decision-that-counts. Because each question is equally likely, you should
treat each decision as if it were the one that determines your payments. Two
more random numbers will be drawn by throwing two ten sided die to determine
whether or not the payments you chose will actually be sent.
 You will get an e-mail reminder the day before your payment is scheduled to
arrive.
 Your payment, by check, will be sent by campus mail to the mailbox number you
provide.
 Campus mail guarantees 100% on-time delivery.
 You have received the business card for Professor James Andreoni. Keep this card
in a safe place and contact Prof. Andreoni immediately if one of your payments
is not received.
40A.4 Solving Numerically for Out of Sample ct Predictions
We consider the case where certain and uncertain consumption are evaluated with
dierent preference parameters. That is u() 6= v(). We assume CRRA utility in each
case v(ct) = (ct   !) and u(ct) = (ct   !) with  6= . ! can be thought of as a
Stone-Geary minimum parameter.
Let p1 = 1 and p2 < 1 such that sooner consumption is certain and later consump-




 s:t: (1 + r)ct + ct+k = m
Yielding the marginal condition:
p1(ct   !) 1
p2k  (ct+k   !) 1 = (1 + r)
(ct   !) 1
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41(ct   !)
B = A[m   (1 + r)ct   !]
(ct   !)
B = Am   A(1 + r)ct   A!]
(ct   !)
B + A(1 + r)ct + A!   Am = 0
Provided estimates for ;;;! as obtained in Table 2, A and B are known con-
stants. The numerical root to the above Bth order polynomial for a given p1;p2;1 + r
and k will be the predicted value of ct in the situation. Many algorithms exist for
obtaining such function roots. This is the methodology for obtaining out of sample
predicted values in Figure 6 and is easily applied to situations where both payments
are uncertain or both payments are certain.
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